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Abstract—The paper considers physical layer security (PLS)
of an untrusted unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network, where
a multitude of UAVs communicate in full-duplex (FD) mode.
A source-based jamming (SBJ) scheme is exploited for secure
communication without utilizing any external jammers. Firstly,
the optimal power allocation between the confidential signal and
the jamming signal is derived to maximize the secrecy rate of each
link between the source and the destination. Then, the best UAV
selection scheme is proposed to maximize the overall secrecy rate
of the network. The corresponding secrecy outage probability
(SOP) and the average secrecy rate (ASR) of the network are
analyzed based on the proposed UAV selection and the optimal
power allocation schemes. Asymptotic results are also obtained
to derive the achievable diversity order. Results are validated
through numerical evaluations while providing useful network
design insights such as locations and altitudes of the UAVs.
Index Terms—Full-duplex, optimal power allocation, physical
layer security, source jamming, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
I. INTRODUCTION
Several new technologies have been developed during
the past decade to to fulfill the different requirements of
5G and beyond wireless networks, e.g., massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO), non-orthogonal multiple ac-
cess (NOMA), millimeter wave, cognitive and cooperative
communications, energy harvesting, backscatter communica-
tions, Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) communications, to
name a few [1]–[3]. Among them, UAVs have been identified
as a promising technique for wireless communication purposes
due to their deployment flexibility. While UAVs have a broad
range of applications including military, surveillance and mon-
itoring and delivery, UAV-assisted wireless connectivity for
telecommunications has been considered as a key enabler for
rescue operations, specially when the existing infrastructure is
unavailable. In emergency networks for disaster management,
UAVs can act as aerial mobile relays to facilitate information
exchange between affected areas and remote data centers
or base stations [4], [5]. However, UAV networks are also
vulnerable to potential attacks from eavesdroppers. Thus,
physical-layer security (PLS), which exploits the physical
characteristics of the wireless environment, is crucial for
reliable communications.
A. Related work
For trusted UAVs, PLS has been considered in the recent
research efforts [6]–[12]. In [6], a UAV-enabled relay network
under an external eavesdropper was investigated to maximize
the average achievable secrecy rate by optimizing the transmit
power allocation among the flight period. In [8], a cooper-
ative jamming scheme was introduced to secure the UAV
communication by leveraging on jamming from other nearby
UAVs. For multiple UAV relays, an opportunistic relaying in
the presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers was investigated
in [9], where the UAV-transmitter and UAV-relay pair with
the highest end-to-end signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is selected.
Moreover, UAVs can also participate as friendly jammers for
unsecured ground communication links, e.g., [10], [11], or as
external eavesdroppers for ground communications, e.g., [12].
The secrecy performance of an UAV-to-UAV system was also
studied under a group of UAV eavesdroppers in [13].
B. Problem statement
It is important to note that all these research efforts are
on trusted half-duplex UAVs. Due to the sudden and/or un-
planned deployments, similar to traditional relays [14], [15],
the performance of UAV networks may be disrupted by
untrusted behavior of UAVs. Therefore, in this paper, we
study an untrusted UAV network. Since, with a proper self-
interference cancellation, full-duplex (FD) communications
achieve a higher multiplexing gain than half-duplex (HD) com-
munications, e.g., [16], FD communication is one of the key
transmission techniques for 5G and beyond applications. We
thus consider FD UAVs as well. To the best of our knowledge,
untrusted UAV-assisted HD or FD communications have not
been investigated on the PLS perspective in the open literature,
and is still an open problem. To fill in this research gap,
this paper studies the PLS of an untrusted FD multiple UAV
network. Apart from the untrusted UAVs, we assume that
other malicious users such as external jammers do not affect
the performance of the network. Therefore, unlike in previous
work on external jamming, we consider source based jamming
(SBJ) [17]. The receiving node which may be a remote base
station can also consist of multiple antennas.
C. Contributions
Based on some fundamental results in [17], we first deduce
the optimal power allocation at the ground transmitter with
respect to the secrecy rate. We then consider the best UAV
selection scheme in order to maximize the secrecy rate. The
best single-relay selection is important because it reduces
synchronization issues at the receiver while achieving a higher
spatial diversity [18]. Based on single-UAV selection and
the optimal power allocation schemes, we derive the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) in closed-form, and also analyze
the average secrecy rate (ASR) over Nakagami-m multi-path
fading and standard UAV path-loss model. Moreover, we
provide insightful asymptotic results to further investigate the
PLS performance of an UAV-assisted network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1: A wireless network with single untrusted FD UAV.
We consider a UAV-assisted wireless communication net-
work. A set of R untrusted UAVs (U), whose locations are
fixed, is deployed as aerial relays to support uplink commu-
nication for user equipment (UE). We consider an arbitrary
UE, hereafter referred to as the source node (S), whose uplink
communication is blocked by obstacles as shown in Fig. 1. For
example, consider a scenario where terrestrial infrastructure is
destroyed due to a natural disaster. S may still access the core
network through a far away base station, hereafter referred to
as the destination (D), with the aid of the UAVs. Since such
an ad-hoc network is not pre-planned, the supportive UAVs
may not be trustworthy. Therefore, we assume that the UAVs
assist communication as amplify-and-forward (AF) relays. To
improve the throughput, the relays operate in the in-band full-
duplex (FD) mode. A single transmit antenna is used by S,
while D is equipped with a maximal-ratio combiner (MRC)
with N receive antennas. The UAVs are equipped with an
antenna for transmission and an antenna for reception.
With SBJ, S transmits a composite signal containing the
confidential signal xs and a jamming signal xj . Ps is the
power budget of S and a ∈ [0, 1] is the power allocation
ratio. Thus, the power in xs and xj is given by aPs and
(1− a)Ps, respectively. Furthermore, both signals are of unit
average energy. We assume that D has full knowledge of xj ,
and full channel state information (CSI), i.e., for each i ∈ U ,
the CSI of the link between S and i, and the CSI of the link
between i and D. This enables jamming signal cancellation
and MRC based detection. We assume that the UAVs do not
hinder the CSI acquisition process [19].
For UAV i ∈ U , let Si denote the link between S and i,
and let Di denote the link between i and D. We use | · |
to represent the spatial distance between the transmitter and
the receiver of such a link. The fading channel amplitudes
of these links are modeled as independent and identically
distributed Nakagami-m random variables (RVs) [20]. Sim-
ilarly, for UAV i ∈ U , Hi denotes the altitude, and dS,i and
dD,i denote the distances from S and D to the projection
of i on the ground plane, respectively. Following [21], the
average path loss for a ground to UAV (or UAV to ground)
link of length r is given by l¯r = r
α (4πf/c)
2
(ηLpL + ηNpN),
where pL = 1/ [1 + ω exp (−β [θ − ω])] , pN = 1 − pL, θ =
180
π arctan
(
Hi
di
)
, r =
√
H2i + d
2
i ; di ∈ {dS,i, dD,i}; f is the
carrier frequency, c = 3×108 m/s, α is the path loss exponent,
ηL, ηN, ω, and β are constants that depend on factors such
as blockage density, height and the density of surrounding
buildings.
At time τ , the received signal at UAV i ∈ U is given by
yi(τ) =
[√
aPs
l¯|Si|
xs(τ) +
√
(1− a)Ps
l¯|Si|
xj(τ)
]
hSi
+I(τ) + ni(τ),
(1)
where hSi denote the fading channel coefficient of link Si,
ni(τ) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
variance σ2u, and I(τ) is the residual self-interference (RSI).
The RSI is assumed to be independent of other signals, and
follows a Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance
σ2I [22].
Assuming variable gain AF relaying, the
amplification gain of i ∈ U is given by Gi =√
Pu
[
Ps|hSi |2/l¯|Si| + σ2I + σ2u
]−1/2
, where Pu is the
transmit power of the UAV. Thus, the transmit signal from i
is Giyi(τ − ∆), where ∆ is the processing delay at i [23],
and the corresponding received signal vector at D is given by
yDi(τ) =
Gi√
l¯|Di|
yi(τ −∆)hDi + nD(τ) (2)
where hDi denotes the fading channel coefficient vector of
link Di, and nD(τ) is the AWGN vector at D with variance
σ2D.
We define the interference-to-noise ratio (INR) at i ∈ U
as ΓI , σ
2
I/σ
2
u. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios
(SINRs) at i and D can then be given, respectively, as
Γ˜i(a) =
aΓSi
(1− a)ΓSi + 1
and Γ˜Di(a) =
aΓSiΓDi
ΓSi + ΓDi + 1
, (3)
where ΓSi and ΓDi are the SNRs of Si and Di links,
respectively, given by
ΓSi ,
Ps|hSi |2
l¯|Si|σ
2
u(1 + ΓI)
and ΓDi ,
Pu
l¯|Di|σ
2
d
N∑
ℓ=1
|hℓ|2, (4)
where hℓ is the ℓ-th element of hDi .
Following the Nakagami-m fading model, σ2Si and σ
2
Di
are
the respective scale parameters of Si and Di channels with
m as the shape parameter. When m is an integer, the fading
power is Gamma distributed, and hence, RV ΓSi follows
a Gamma distribution with shape parameter m and scale
parameter γ¯Si , Psσ
2
Si
/
(
σ2u l¯|Si|(ΓI + 1)
)
. Similarly, RV ΓDi
also follows a Gamma distribution with shape parameter Nm
and scale parameter γ¯Di , Puσ
2
Di
/
(
σ2d l¯|Di|
)
. The symbols
fX , and FX are used to denote the probability density function
(PDF) and the CDF of an RV X , respectively.
The instantaneous achievable secrecy rate using i ∈ U as a
relay can then be expressed as
Ci(a) =
[
ln(1 + Γ˜Di(a))− ln(1 + Γ˜i(a))
]+
, (5)
where [x]+ , max{0, x} [17].
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS WITH UAV
SELECTION
Single relay selection is a widely used technique to improve
the spectral efficiency, and the end-to-end (e2e) latency of
relay networks, while achieving full diversity order [18]. Fur-
thermore, relay selection reduces the synchronization issues
compared to multiple-relay communications. Therefore, we
employ relay selection, such that a single UAV is selected
as the relay to assist communication between S and D. Here,
we select the UAV that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy
rate of the system. The power allocation ratio a is a key
factor determining the secrecy rate of the system. Therefore,
firstly, we use the results in [17] to deduce the optimal power
allocation ratio for our setup. To this end, the optimal power
allocation ratio a∗ that maximizes the system secrecy rate is
given by
a∗ = argmax
0≤a≤1
Ci(a) = argmax
0≤a≤1
max{Ψ(a), 1},
where Ψ(a) , (1 + Γ˜Di(a))/(1 + Γ˜i(a)), and the second
equality is written using the monotonicity of the logarithm
function. Following [17], when ΓDi < 1 + 1/ΓSi , i.e., when
Si or Di channels are encountering deep fading, Ci(a) = 0
for any a ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that the transmission is futile
and S should be kept idle to save energy. When this condition
does not hold, the optimal power allocation ratio is given by
a∗ =
1
2
(
1− 1 + ΓSi
ΓSiΓDi
)
, (6)
which leads to
Γ˜∗i =
ΓSi(ΓDi − 1)− 1
(ΓSi + 2)ΓDi + ΓSi + 1
, Γ˜∗Di =
ΓSi(ΓDi − 1)− 1
2 (ΓDi + ΓSi + 1)
,
(7)
where Γ˜∗i = Γ˜i(a
∗) and Γ˜∗Di = Γ˜Di(a
∗). It is not hard to show
that Γ˜∗i < 1, which implies that the achievable secrecy rate at
the UAV is low. On the other hand, Γ˜∗Di is unbounded implying
that with preferable channel realizations, D can achieve high
secrecy rates. This also means Γ˜∗Di−Γ˜∗i ≥ 0 is possible, which
implies the possibility of secure information transmission.
Once the optimal power allocation ratios for the links
through all UAVs are determined, the UAV which maximizes
the e2e secrecy rate, i∗, can be found as
i∗ = argmax
1≤i≤R
Ci(a
∗). (8)
Next, we analyze the achievable performance with the
selected UAV. For this, we evaluate the SOP and the ASR
of the system.
A. SOP Analysis
A secrecy outage event (hereafter referred to as outage)
occurs when C∗i (a
∗) = 0, where C∗i (a
∗) is the secrecy rate
achievable with the best (i∗) UAV [17]. It is important to note
that without power allocation between xs and xj , i.e., when
a = 1 or a = 0, the system will always be in outage. For an
example, when a = 1, one can observe that Γ˜i > Γ˜Di , since
ΓSi and ΓDi are always greater than or equal to zero. This
makes Ψ(1) < 1, and Ci(1) = 0. Therefore, it is essential to
employ SBJ with a proper power allocation scheme.
Using SBJ with the optimal power allocation, the SOP of
the proposed UAV selection scheme is given by
SOP ∗ = Pr {C∗i (a∗) ≤ 0} = Pr
{
max
i
(Ci(a
∗)) ≤ 0
}
(a)
=
R∏
i=1
Pr {Ci(a∗) ≤ 0}
(b)≈ [Pr {Ci(a∗) ≤ 0}]R = [SOP ∗i ]R . (9)
where (a) follows from the independence of the fading channel
coefficients of all links, and in (b), we have assumed that the
R UAVs are located in a manner that the average path loss
values from S and D to each of the UAVs are approximately
equal. SOP ∗i is the SOP of the link via the i-th UAV.
Using SBJ with the optimal power allocation scheme, we
have already established that the source device will be idle
if ΓDi < 1 + 1/ΓSi . It is not hard to see that the probability
of this event captures the SOP of a link via the i-th UAV. An
analytical expression for this probability is presented through
the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The SOP of the link via the i-th UAV is given by
SOP ∗i = 1−
2e
− 1
γ¯Di
Γ(m)
×
Nm−1∑
k=0
k∑
ℓ=0
(γ¯Si)
ℓ−k−m
2 Km−k+ℓ
(
2√
γ¯Si γ¯Di
)
(γ¯Di)
ℓ+k+m
2 (k − ℓ)! ℓ!
(10)
where Kn (·) is the modified Bessel function of the second
kind.
Proof: Since SOP ∗i = Pr[ΓDi < 1 +
1
ΓSi
], we have
SOP ∗i =
∫ ∞
0
FΓDi
(
1 +
1
t
)
fΓSi (t)dt
(a)
= 1−
Nm−1∑
k=0
e
− 1
γ¯Di
k!γ¯kDi
∫ ∞
0
(
1 +
1
t
)k
tm−1
Γ(m)γ¯mSi
e
− 1
γ¯Di
t
− t
γ¯Si dt
where (a) follows from the substitution of the respective
PDF and CDF of ΓSi and ΓDi . Applying the identity∫∞
0 x
v−1e−a/x−bxdx = 2 (a/b)
v
2 Kv(2
√
ab) together with the
binomial expansion completes the proof.
Substituting (10) in (9), gives us the SOP of the system.
B. ASR Analysis
The ASR of a system is another important measure of the
secrecy performance. The ASR is defined as the probabilistic
average of the instantaneous secrecy rate of the system. For
the system model under consideration, with optimal power
allocated SBJ and secrecy rate maximizing relay selection,
the ASR can be expressed as
C¯ = E [C∗i (a
∗)] = E
[
max
1≤i≤R
[
log
(
1 + Γ˜∗Di
1 + Γ˜∗i
)]]
. (11)
To simplify (11), from (7) one can observe that the ratio
Γ˜∗Di
Γ˜∗i
=
Γ˜∗Di + 1. Substituting this relationship in (11), gives us
C¯ = E

log

1 + max
1≤i≤R


(
Γ˜∗Di
)2
2Γ˜∗Di + 1





 .
To evaluate the expectation, let max (zi) = Y where zi =
(Γ˜∗Di)
2
2Γ˜∗
Di
+1
. Thus, from integration by parts,
C¯ =
∫ ∞
0
1− FY (y)
1 + y
dy, (12)
where FY (y) = [Fzi(y)]
R
using the i.i.d. assumption made
earlier. Furthermore,
Fzi(y) = Pr


(
Γ˜∗Di
)2
2Γ˜∗Di + 1
≤ y

 = Pr
{(
Γ˜∗Di − y
)2
≤ y2 + y
}
= FΓ˜∗Di
(
y +
√
y2 + y
)
.
Thus, from (12), we get
C¯ =
∫ ∞
0
1−
[
FΓ˜∗
Di
(
y +
√
y2 + y
)]R
(1 + y)
dy. (13)
We obtain an expression for the CDF FΓ˜∗
Di
through the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. The CDF of RV Γ˜∗Di is given by
FΓ˜∗
Di
(t) = 1− 2e
−2t
(
1
γ¯Si
+ 1
γ¯Di
)
e
1
γ¯Di Γ(m)
Nm−1∑
k=0
k∑
ℓ=0
m−1∑
r=0
(2t)m−1−r
× (2t+ 1)k+r+1
(
k
ℓ
)(
m−1
r
)
Kr−ℓ+1
(
2(2t+1)√
γ¯Si γ¯Di
)
k! (γ¯Di)
k+ r−ℓ+1
2 (γ¯Si)
m− r−ℓ+1
2
. (14)
Proof: For t ≥ 0, we can write
F
Γ˜
∗
Di
(t) = Pr
[
Γ˜∗Di = 0
]
+ Pr
[
0 < Γ˜∗Di ≤ t
]
= Pr
[
ΓDi ≤ 1 +
1
ΓSi
]
+ Pr
[
ΓDi >
(2t+ 1)(1 + ΓSi)
(ΓSi − 2t)
,ΓSi < 2t,ΓDi > 1 +
1
ΓSi
]
+ Pr
[
ΓDi ≤
(2t+ 1)(1 + ΓSi)
(ΓSi − 2t)
,ΓSi > 2t,ΓDi > 1 +
1
ΓSi
]
= FΓSi (2t) +
∫
∞
2t
FΓDi
(
(2t+ 1) (1 + x)
(x− 2t)
)
fΓSi (x)dx.
Substituting the respective PDF and CDF of ΓSi and ΓDi and
solving the integral applying the transformation y = x − 2t
and the binomial expansion, yields (14).
Substituting (14) in (13) gives us an expression for ASR,
which can be evaluated using numerical integration techniques.
C. High SNR SOP Analysis
The derived SOP and ASR expressions are useful in ob-
taining exact performance values of the system. However, for
certain applications, it is useful to obtain direct insights on
the system behaviour in the high SNR regime. Hence, we
derive approximations for the SOP in the high SNR regime
and evaluate the diversity order of the system. For the high
SNR regime, we let γ¯ = Ps/σ
2
u = δPu/σ
2
d ≫ 1.
When N = 1 andm = 1, using the relation xK1(x) ≈ 1 for
small x, (9) can be approximated as SOP ∗ ≈ (1− e−
1
γ¯Di )R,
giving a diversity order of R for the system. For an arbitrary
integer m, when N ≥ 2, SOP ∗i can be lower bounded as
SOP ∗i ≥ max
{
Pr (ΓDi < 1) ,Pr
(
ΓDi <
1
ΓSi
)}
= max
{
γ¯−Nm(δl¯|Di|)
Nm
(Nm)!
,
(
δl¯|Si| l¯|Di|(1 + ΓI)
γ¯2
)m
Γ((N − 1)m)
m!(Nm− 1)!
}
,
(15)
where the Taylor series expansions of FΓDi (t) and fΓDi (t) are
used to compute the probabilities. Furthermore, SOP ∗i can be
upper bounded as
SOP ∗i ≤ Pr (ΓDi < 2) + Pr
(
ΓDi <
2
ΓSi
)
=
(
2δl¯|Si|l¯|Di|(1 + ΓI)
γ¯2
)m
Γ((N − 1)m)
m!(Nm− 1)!
+
γ¯−Nm(2δl¯|Di|)
Nm
(Nm)!
.
(16)
From (15) and (16), one can deduce that the diversity order
of 2m can be achieved with a single UAV. Therefore, by
selecting the best UAV out of U results in a diversity order of
2Rm, when N ≥ 2. It is interesting to note that the diversity
order is independent of N .
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Fig. 2: The SOP vs. Ps in an urban environment for SBJ with
m = 2.
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Fig. 3: The ASR vs. Ps in an urban environment for N = 2,
and m = 2.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present numerical results for validation of
the theoretical results, and to draw insights to provide recom-
mendations on UAV network design for secure communica-
tions. Radio propagation parameters (ω, β, ηL(dB), ηN (dB))
for the urban environmental conditions are given as (9.61,
0.16, 1, 20) [24] and Ps = Pu. It is assumed that ΓI = 1
in the numerical results.
Firstly, Figs. 2 and 3 present the SOP and ASR performance
vs. Ps for different values of R and N . In the legends, BS
refers to the best UAV selection scheme, while RS refers to
random UAV selection. One can clearly observe the excellent
agreement of analytical results with simulation results, con-
firming their accuracy. Furthermore, the slopes of the SOP
curves in the high SNR regime remains the same for N = 2
and N = 4, when R is fixed. This confirms our observation
of the independence between the diversity order and N when
N > 2. Also, the best UAV selection outperforms random
UAV selection, where one can observe that the SOP and the
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10-3
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100
Fig. 4: SOP vs. Ps in an urban environment for SBJ with
different power allocation schemes when N = 2, and m = 2.
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Fig. 5: ASR vs. Hi for R UAVs, when Ps = 20dBm, N = 2,
and m = 2, in an urban environment.
ASR of random UAV selection are similar to the case with a
single UAV. This highlights the importance of UAV selection
in achieving better secrecy performance.
Next, Fig. 4 illustrates the SOP performance of SBJ schemes
for different power allocation ratios. As predicted through
the analytical results, the system is always in outage when
power is not allocated to the jamming signal (a = 1).
Furthermore, the performance gain achieved with the optimal
power allocation compared to a heuristic power allocation
scheme can be clearly identified.
Furthermore, Fig. 5 presents the ASR behaviour with the
UAV altitude for different R values. It is assumed that the
set of relays are placed close to each other such that the link
lengths remain almost the same for all UAVs. At first, ASR
improves with the UAV altitude since the probability of a LoS
link increases withHi. However, one can identify the existence
of an optimal altitude which maximizes the ASR, after which
the ASR decreases due to the dominant effect of increased
path loss. Therefore, it is important to choose a proper UAV
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Fig. 6: ASR vs D for different placement schemes, when Ps =
15 dBm, N = 2, and m = 2, in an urban environment.
altitude to achieve a favourable ASR for the system.
Finally, Fig. 6 shows the behaviour of the ASR with L, the
distance between S and D, for two UAV placement schemes.
In Placement 1, UAVs are placed at the same altitude such
that the projections of the UAVs on the ground plane equally
divide the distance between S and D. Placement 2 refers to the
scenario where UAVs are placed at different altitudes such that
their projections on the ground plane bisect the line between
S and D. The results show that Placement 1 is preferred for
small values of L, while Placement 2 is preferred for larger
values of L. When L is small, there is a higher chance of
finding an LoS link with a relay, and hence, we prefer the
relay to be as close as possible to S and D to minimize the
effect of path loss. This leads to Placement 1 being better for
smaller values of L. On the other hand, when L increases,
increasing the altitude of the relay increases the possibility of
connection establishment through an LoS link. This leads to
Placement 2 being better for larger values of L.
V. CONCLUSION
The secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy
rate of UAV relay assisted communication were investigated.
Source based jamming with optimal power allocation among
the useful signal and the jamming signal was used to achieve
secure communications through untrusted UAV relays. The
best UAV selection scheme was proposed to improve the
secrecy performance of the network. The results demonstrate
the achievable secrecy performance gain with optimal power
allocation and relay selection schemes, providing a diversity
order of 2Rm for the system. Furthermore, useful network
design insights such as locations and altitudes to place UAV
relays were inferred from the numerical results.
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